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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, 3,785 children were born out of wedlock in Nebraska.' The
number of nonnarital2 children has risen sharply over the last ten
years,3 increasing public and legislative interest in creating laws which
1. Telephone interview with Mark Miller, Data Coordinator, Nebraska Division of
Health Data (Oct. 29, 1987) (hereinafter Interview).
2. The word "nonmarital" will be used in this Note to refer to any child born of
unmarried parents, since the word "illegitimate" may be considered disparaging.
See Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Propos-
als for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10, 53 n.228 (1975). The substitution
of "nonmarital" is intended to be consistent with the Supreme Court's usage of
the word "illegitimate." See, eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
3. Two thousand four hundred fifty-eight children were born out of wedlock in Ne-
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will facilitate adoptions.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has acknowledged that the state has
a compelling interest in facilitating "the transfer of children by relin-
quishment from unwed mothers and the adoption of those children."4
However, under Nebraska's current statutory procedures regarding
paternity and adoption, the court is unable to apply Nebraska law in a
way which both facilitates speedy adoptions and protects the rights
and interests of all parties involved. This problem is clearly evident in
light of Nebraska's most recent adoption case, In re Application of
S.R.S and M.B.S. 5
In S.R.S. & M.B.S., the Nebraska Supreme Court invalidated the
adoption of a nonmarital child because the child's biological father had
not consented to the adoption.6 The court held the Nebraska statute,
which does not require an unwed father's consent to the adoption of
his child unless the father has filed an intent to claim paternity within
five days of the child's birth,7 was unconstitutional as applied to the
father in S.R.S. & M.B.S.8
As a result of S.R.S. & MB.S., Nebraska's paternity and adoption
laws do not provide answers to two very important questions: 1) to
what extent are the rights of unwed fathers protected in Nebraska,
and 2) when can an adoption be considered final so that the rights of
adoptive parents are protected? This Note addresses both unanswered
questions. Part I provides background information regarding the
rights of unwed fathers under United States Supreme Court and Ne-
braska Supreme Court decisions. Part II discusses S.R.S. & M.B.S. and
analyzes its effect on current Nebraska paternity and adoption law.
Part III recommends reformation of Nebraska's paternity and adop-
tion statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rights of Unwed Fathers Under United States Supreme
Court Decisions
The rights of unwed fathers have been examined several times in
braska in 1977, compared to three thousand seven hundred eighty-five born out of
wedlock in 1986. Interview, supra note 1.
4. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 575, 385 N.W.2d 448,
449 (1986).
5. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987), reh'g denied, (Nebraska Supreme Court Min-
ute Record, Case No. 10830).
6. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 279.
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984). For the exact language of the statute, see
infra note 46.
8. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272,279 (1987).
[Vol. 67:383
NOTICE OF RELINQUISHMENT
the past few years by the United States Supreme Court.9 The
Supreme Court first liberalized the rights of unwed fathers in Stanley
v. Illinois.10 The father in Stanley lived with the biological mother
and their three children intermittently for eighteen years, but failed
to legitimize the children according to the procedures defined by Illi-
nois law. Upon the mother's death, the children were placed with a
state-appointed guardian.' The Court held that all putative fathers
must be afforded a hearing on their custodial claims and remanded the
case to the lower court to determine the unwed father's parental
fitness.12
The Court did not set forth a test for the lower court to use to
determine the unwed father's parental fitness,13 but did emphasize
that the right of an unwed father to custody of his nonmarital child
merits constitutional protection. However, the form this protection
should take was not clear because of a footnote in the decision which
stated that unwed fathers are entitled to notice and a hearing with
respect to adoption and custody proceedings concerning their
children.14
The footnote caused many states to assume that unwed fathers
have a right to notice of adoption and custody proceedings concerning
their children. Such states have responded by enacting statutes which
require various forms of notification. For example, Wisconsin re-
cently enacted a statute that set forth stringent procedures a court
must follow to identify, locate, and give notice to an unwed father of
custody or adoption proceedings concerning his child.15 Wisconsin re-
quires a hearing be held prior to the termination of the father's rights,
and the court has the discretion to require that the father be notified
of the hearing through publication, if necessary.16
Other states require that the father be notified of adoption and cus-
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 245 (1978);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11. Id. at 649. Under ILL. REv. STAT. §§ 702-1 and 702-5 (1972), nonmarital children
become wards of the state upon the death of the mother. Id.
12. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, conclude& "[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on
their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that
denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other
Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." IM
13. The Court noted only that the cost of individualized fitness hearings was mini-
mal. Id. at 657 n.9. However, the Court may soon determine the proper standard
to be applied at an unwed father's parental fitness hearing. See In re Baby Girl
M, 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918,207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984), appeal docketed sub nom.,
McNamara v. City of San Diego, No. 87-5840 (U.S. April 24, 1988).
14. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (West 1987).
16. Id-
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tody proceedings concerning his child only if the father previously ac-
knowledged the child in some way. For example, South Dakota
requires that notice be given to the father as long as the father ac-
knowledged paternity within sixty days of the birth of the child.17
Minnesota requires that the father be given notice of any proceedings
concerning his child if: 1) the father's name is on the child's birth
certificate; 2) the father supported the child or mother financially; 3)
the father openly lived with the mother or child; or 4) the father filed
an affidavit of paternity with the county court.'8
Stanley left the scope of an unwed father's rights in question, but
the boundaries became clearer in Quilloin v. Walcott.19 In Quilloin,
the parents had never lived together and had never married. The
mother married another man when the child was two years old. The
father provided sporadic support and visited the child on an irregular
basis. When the child was eleven, the mother consented to an adop-
tion by her husband. The biological father's consent was not required
under Georgia statutes, but when he received notice of the impending
adoption, he objected.20
The unwed father in Quilloin claimed that an unwed father is enti-
tled to an absolute veto with respect to the adoption of his child, just
as married or divorced fathers are, unless the court finds him an unfit
parent.21 However, using the "best interests of the child" standard,
the Court determined the father in Quilloin was not entitled to veto
the adoption of his child because he had not supported or nurtured the
child.22 The Court determined the unwed father's rights were "read-
ily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced father" and,
therefore, the Court affirmed the adoption petition that lacked the un-
wed father's consent.23
In Caban v. Mohammed, 4 the Court again evaluated an unwed fa-
ther's rights based on the degree of responsibility he had shown to-
ward his children. The children in Caban were young, unlike the
eleven year old child in Quilloin. The children had lived with both
parents for two years before the couple separated. The Court in
Caban determined that the father had acknowledged paternity and
had established a relationship with and supported his nonmarital chil-
dren. He, therefore, could not be barred by statute2 5 from an opportu-
nity to oppose the children's adoption. The Court held that the
17. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (Supp. 1983).
18. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.26 (Supp. 1984).
19. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
20. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-103(3), 74-203 (1976).
21. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 253 (1978).
22. Id, at 255.
23. Id at 256.
24. 441 U.S. 380 (1981).
25. N.Y DOM. REL. LAw, §§ 111, illa (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).
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differential statutory treatment afforded unwed mothers and unwed
fathers did not bear a substantial relationship to the acknowledged
state interest of providing adoptive homes for nonmarital children.26
The Court thus found it unconstitutional for states to deny unwed fa-
thers the power to veto the adoption of their children in cases in which
the father has established a relationship with his nonmarital children
and has aided in their support and nurturance.27 Caban appears to be
limited to the facts of the case,28 therefore, a proper reading of Caban
should focus on the Court's rationale, rather than the result.29
Both Caban and Quilloin appear to set the standard that an unwed
father has no absolute parental rights without having manifested sig-
nificant paternal interest. Accordingly, a father who does not accept
financial or emotional responsibility for his child most likely cannot
expect his rights to be protected to the same degree as other parents.30
However, while the Court determined the unwed father's rights based
on whether he had "come forward to participate in the rearing of his
child,"3' the Court failed to provide any guidance concerning the
proper criteria that should be used to distinguish "responsible" unwed
fathers from "irresponsible" ones.32 The lack of criteria is particularly
problematic in cases in which the unwed mother relinquishes the
child as an infant and, consequently, the father never has an opportu-
nity to establish a parental relationship with his child.
In Lehr v. Robertson,3 3 the Court considered the rights of an unwed
father who was not given the opportunity to establish a parental rela-
tionship with his infant child prior to adoption of the child by the
mother's husband. In Lehr, the father lived with the mother prior to
the child's birth, but the father's name did not appear on the child's
birth certificate.3 4 The father claimed the mother concealed the
child's whereabouts for two years after the child's birth. When the
26. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
27. Id. at 392.
28. "In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the
rearing of his child, nothing ... precludes the State from withholding from him
the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." 1d. The dissent agreed that
the Caban holding should be limited to similar factual situations involving the
adoption of a child "against the wishes of a natural father who previously ha[d]
participated in the rearing of the child and who admit[ted] paternity." 1d. at 409
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
29. Comment, Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 29 EMORY L.J. 833, 848 (1980).
30. Comment, Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois: Caban v. Mohammed,
57 DEN. L.J. 671, 677 (1980).
31. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
32. The Court in Caban did not explain what conduct is expected of the unwed father
in order to establish a parental right. See Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the
Unwed Father:. The Boundaries Are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 (1980-1981).
33. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
34. I& at 252. Nevertheless, the mother told friends and family and the New York
State Department of Social Services that Lehr was the father. Id
1988]
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father, with the help of a detective, finally was able to locate the
mother and child, the mother refused his offer to provide financial
support for the child3 5
Eight months after the child's birth, the mother married another
man. When the child was two years old, the other man petitioned to
adopt the child. One month later the biological father filed a request
to determine paternity and reasonable visitation privileges.3 6 The fa-
ther claimed he was unaware of the pending adoption when he filed
the request to determine paternity, but as soon as he learned of the
adoption, his attorney notified the court that the father planned to
seek a stay of the adoption.37 The county court granted the adoption,
notwithstanding the biological father's objection and request for pa-
rental rights.38
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the "mere existence of a bio-
logical link does not merit [an unwed father] equivalent constitutional
protection" as compared to a married, separated, or divorced father.39
The father in Lehr did not have a significant custodial, personal, or
financial relationship with the child and allegedly did not seek to es-
tablish a legal tie until the child was two years old. Therefore, the
Court only considered whether the New York statute adequately pro-
tected the father's opportunity to form such a relationship.40
The New York statute set forth categories of unwed fathers who
were deemed "worthy" of receiving notice of adoption proceedings in-
volving their children.41 The father in Lehr did not fall within those
categories and, therefore, did not receive notice. The father claimed
that the statutory scheme which arbitrarily denied notification to cer-
tain unwed fathers was unconstitutional. The Court held that if New
York's statutory scheme "was likely to omit many responsible fathers
and, if qualifications for notice were beyond the control of an inter-
ested putative father, it might be procedurally inadequate."42 Never-
theless, the Court found the statute valid, holding that "the legitimate
state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and hav-
ing the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously... justify a trial
judge's determination to require all interested parties to adhere pre-
cisely to the procedural requirements." 43
The Court also determined that the New York adoption procedures
were designed to promote the best interests of the child, protect the
35. Id.
36. Id at 250-253.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id at 261.
40. Id at 262.
41. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111, illa (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).
42. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983).
43. Id. at 265.
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rights of interested third parties, and insure promptness and finality.44
The Court concluded that states are not prevented from granting dif-
ferent legal rights to parents who have not established custodial rela-
tionships with their child from those who have established such
relationships. 45
The Court's decision in Lehr did nothing to clarify an unwed fa-
ther's rights in cases in which the child is a newborn infant at the time
of relinquishment by the mother. When the child is an infant, an un-
wed father never has the opportunity to establish a parental relation-
ship. Without an opportunity to manifest love and responsibility for
the infant, the unwed father is effectively precluded from being able
to fulfill the Supreme Court's standards under which he could receive
parental rights in custody and adoption proceedings concerning his
child.
Through Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, the United States
Supreme Court has protected only the rights of unwed fathers to the
same degree as married, divorced, or separated fathers in cases in
which the father has established a responsible relationship with the
child. As noted above, establishing responsibility is nearly impossible
if the child is an infant. If any general rule can be gleaned from these
decisions, it is that an unwed father's rights regarding his nonmarital
child are contingent on a judicial evaluation of his behavior prior to
and after the child's birth. A father can lose his rights if his behavior
does not conform to a judicial interpretation of statutory standards
which vary from state to state. The unfortunate result of this rule is
that neither unwed fathers, unwed mothers, attorneys, nor adoptive
parents know the rights and obligations of a specific unwed father
prior to a judicial evaluation of the case. Such judicial evaluation is
almost always after the child has been placed in an adoptive home.
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to know if an adoption is truly
final when the adoption petition is granted. Such uncertainty results
in a constant threat to the finality of adoptions.
B. The Rights of Unwed Fathers According to the Nebraska
Supreme Court
In Nebraska, an unwed father is given notice that the mother has
relinquished her rights to his child or that an adoption of his child is
pending only if the unwed father has filed an intent to claim paternity
pursuant to Nebraska Revised Statute, section 43-104.02.46 Under sec-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 267-68.
46. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984) provides in pertinent part-
(1) Relinquishment or consent for the purpose of adoption given only by
a mother of a child born out of wedlock pursuant to section 43-104 shall
be sufficient to place the child for adoption and the rights of any alleged
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion 43-104.02, the intent to claim paternity must be filed with the De-
partment of Social Services within five days after the birth of the
child; it is irrelevant whether the father's name is on the birth certifi-
cate, what type of financial or emotional relationship the father has
had with the mother or child, or whether the father is even aware of
the narrow method through which he can establish his paternity
rights.4 7 If an intent to claim paternity is not filed, or is not filed in a
timely fashion, an unwed mother may relinquish her child for adop-
tion notwithstanding the objection of the father. Neither the father's
lack of notice regarding the mother's relinquishment nor the father's
ignorance of the law is sufficient to waive the statute's five-day
requirement.48
In Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, Inc.,49 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld section 43-104.02 and denied the unwed
father parental rights because he had not filed an intent to claim pa-
ternity until nine days after the child's birth. The court held section
43-104.02 constitutional as applied to the unwed father in Shoecraft
because the unwed father failed to support the mother prior to birth
and because he failed to comply with the statute's time limit despite
having knowledge of the impending adoption.50 The court summarily
addressed the father's separate equal protection and due process
claims and upheld the constitutionality of the statute's gender-based
distinctions5l and lack of notice.52 The court preferred to focus on the
statute's five-day filing requirement.
In upholding the five-day filing requirement, the Shoecraft court
placed great emphasis on the fulfillment of legislative objectives and
the constitutionality of the means used to achieve those objectives.
father shall not be recognized thereafter in any court unless the person
claiming to be the father of the child has filed with the Department of
Social Services on forms provided by the Department, within five days
after the birth of such child, a notice of intent to claim paternity.
47. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.04 (1984).
48. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448
(1986), in which the court noted the father, like all citizens was "presumed to
know the law. Statutes of limitation bar evenly the claims of the wary and the
unwary and the just and the unjust." Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 454.
49. 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
50. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
51. Id. at 577, 385 N.W.2d at 451. The court held the state's "compelling interest in
the well-being of all children, whether born in or out of wedlock, and of their
proper nurture and care," is sufficient to justify the "disparate treatment of an
unwed father and an unwed mother." Id.
52. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 452. The court stated that although § 43-104.02 does not
provide notice to the father of the birth or the relinquishment of the child, and
"[tihat omission might well, in a particular case, render constitutionally suspect
as violative of due process the termination of the father's rights.... The lack of
notice... does not render the [statutory] scheme unconstitutional as to the appel-
lee father." Id.
[Vol. 67:383
NOTICE OF RELINQUISHMENT
The court accepted the legislature's determination that the five-day
period was the average length of time a mother spends in the hospital
after giving birth. The court also accepted the rationale that a mother
should know, prior to leaving the hospital, whether the father is going
to come forward to provide support and "legitimize" the child.53 The
court additionally determined that the five-day requirement was rea-
sonable because it furthered the presumed legislative objective of ex-
pediting adoptions.4
The Nebraska Supreme Court incorrectly presumed that expedi-
tion of adoptions was the only legislative intent behind the statute.
The actual intent of the legislature was to facilitate the adoption of
nonmarital children in a manner that would bring the local statute
within the due process guidelines of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions,55 such as Stanley v. Jllinois.56 Both Stanley and the
Nebraska Legislature recognized that expedition of adoption proce-
dures was not a sufficient reason to deny the due process rights of
unwed fathers, and that prior to termination of his rights, an unwed
father deserved both notification and a hearing.
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate
state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional ad-
judication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
ciency ... [Wlhen, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues
of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in defer-
ence to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the impor-
tant interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.5 7
Unfortunately, the Shoecraft court disregarded the Court's reasoning
in Stanley as well as the intent of the Nebraska Legislature. By hold-
ing that effectuating adoptions is a sufficiently compelling reason to
allow disparate treatment of unwed fathers as compared to other par-
ents, the court placed greater importance on the efficacy of the adop-
tion process than the validity of the adoption itself.58
53. Id. at 579, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
54. Id. at 580, 385 N.W.2d at 452.
55. In the 1976 Legislative hearing, the bill's sponsor, Senator Gary Anderson, ex-
pressly pointed out the motivation behind the proposed statute:
The problem basically has to deal with the questions of claims of pater-
nity that might be made by the natural father of the child, a child who is
born out of wedlock and is being placed for adoption. We now have a
situation where the courts have recognized that the father, the natural
father, does at least have a right to a hearing. And some of our courts
are now saying that in order to complete the relinquishment there has to
be relinquishment from the father, or in lieu of that, some form of notice
generally, a publication.
Hearing on LB. 224 Before Nebraska Judiciary Comm, 84th Leg., 1st. Sess. 2
(Jan. 29, 1976).
56. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
57. Id. at 656-57; see supra note 55.
58. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 577, 385 N.W.2d 448,
451 (1986).
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The Shoecraft court noted that a statute which terminates a fa-
ther's parental rights might be "render[ed] constitutionally suspect as
violative of due process," in cases in which the father is not given no-
tice of the termination proceeding.5 9 However, the father in Shoecraft
had knowledge of the pregnancy and the proposed adoption, thus, the
court held that he did not deserve notification and, accordingly, inter-
preted the statute as only requiring notice in cases in which the father
has complied with the requirements of the statute.60 Chief Justice
Krivosha addressed this shortcoming in his dissent in Shoecraft.
While it is true that in the instant case the statute does not automatically deny
the father the right to notice and a hearing, nevertheless it does seek to ac-
complish a similar end. The statute requires that the father must, within five
days after birth, acknowledge paternity in a narrow, limited manner, to wit,
by filling out a form provided by the Department of Social Services. The fa-
ther must also file the form with the Department of Social Services. In my
view, this statutory scheme unconstitutionally discriminates against the
father.6
1
Instead of addressing the procedural shortcomings of section 43-
104.02, the Shoecraft court adopted the language of Quilloin v.
Walcott.62 The court held that a statutory scheme may distinguish the
rights of an unwed father from the rights of a married, divorced, or
separated father in cases in which "the unwed father did not seek nor
exercise any financial responsibility for the child. ' '63 Adopting the
Quilloin language enabled the Shoecraft court to ignore the fact that
section 43-104.02 violates the rights of unwed fathers in the manner
prohibited by Stanley. Thus, the court's strict adherence to statutory
procedures appears to be contrary to both United States Supreme
Court precedent and the intentions of the Nebraska Legislature.
III. IN RE APPLICATION OF S.R.S. & M.B.S.
In Shoecraft, the court implied that a case involving an unwed fa-
ther who had lived with the child and nurtured and supported the
child and the mother might be decided in favor of the unwed father.64
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently decided such a case, In re ap-
plication of S.R.S. & M.B.S.65 Construing the same statute it held con-
stitutional in Shoecraft, the court in S.R.S. & M.B.S. held section 43-
59. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 583, 385 N.W.2d at 454 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
62. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
63. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986).
64. "This is not a case where [the father] lived with the child and nurtured and sup-
ported [the child] and the mother." Id.
65. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
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104.02,66 which requires an unwed father to file an intent to claim pa-
ternity within five days after the birth of the child, unconstitutional as
applied to this particular unwed father.67
In S.R.S. & M.B.S., the child's parents lived together and planned to
marry before the child was conceived. When the child was born, the
unwed father's name appeared on the birth certificate. The parents
also signed an agreement providing the child would bear the father's
last name. The couple lived with their son for approximately nineteen
months. During this time, the father cared for and supported the
mother and the child. When the child was nineteen months old, the
mother and child moved from the father's home and the parents never
reconciled. The mother moved in with another man and refused to
disclose the location of the child to the father. The mother was aware
of the father's desire to retain custody of his child. Nevertheless,
when the child was two years old, the mother placed the child for
adoption, and the child was subsequently placed with prospective
adoptive parents.
Under Nebraska law, adoption decrees cannot be entered until the
child has resided with the prospective adoptive parents for at least six
months.68 During the first five months of the six-month waiting pe-
riod, the father tried to locate his son. When he learned that his son
had been placed for adoption, he contacted an attorney and com-
menced proceedings to establish his parental rights.69 The prospective
adoptive parents, the adoption agency, and the county court were
aware that the child's father had commenced paternity proceedings.70
Yet, the prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption at
the end of the six-month waiting period, and the petition was subse-
quently granted by the county court.71 The county court held the fa-
ther had abandoned his child and could not contest the adoption.72
The District Court of Lancaster County affirmed the county court
decision.7 3
By the time the case was heard by the Nebraska Supreme Court,
66. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984). For the exact language of the statute see
supra note 46.
67. In re Application of S.IRS. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759,769,408 N.W.2d 272,279 (1987).
68. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-109 (1984).
69. In re Application of S.IMS. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 763, 408 N.W.2d 272,275 (1987).
70. Id.
71. In re Adoption #6884, No. 85-395 (Lancaster County Court, filed June 7, 1985).
72. The county court determined the father had abandoned the child pursuant to
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104(3)(b) (1984), which states in pertinent part: "No adop-
tion shall be decreed unless the petition therefor[e] is accompanied by written
consents... except that consent shall not be required of any parent who shall...
have abandoned the child for at least six month next preceding the filing of the
adoption petition..." In re Adoption #6884, No. 85-395 at 8 (Lancaster County
Court, filed June 7, 1985).
73. In re Adoption #6884, No. 85-395 (Lancaster County Court filed Dec. 30, 1985).
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the child was four and one-half years old and had lived with his adop-
tive family for two and one-half years.7 4 Reversing the district court's
decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled the father had not aban-
doned the child, and declared the statute's 75 five-day filing require-
ment unconstitutional as applied to this father.76 The court concluded
that even though the father did not file for paternity rights within the
five days required under section 43-104.02, the father's consent was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.77
Both Shoecraft and S.RS. & M.B.S. noted the integrity of the fam-
ily is a fundamental right retained by the people under Article IX of
the Bill of Rights, and that the "relationship between a parent and
child is constitutionally protected."78 Yet, the court in S.RS. & M.B.S.-
distinguished the consitutional rights of the unwed fathers in
Shoecraft and S.R.S. & M.B.S. because of factual differences between
the cases.
The court stated the rights of the father in SR.S. & M.B.S. "are not
so easily distinguishable from those of the mother or of separated or
divorced fathers . . . [because the father] provided for and had daily
contact with his child for the first nineteen of the twenty-four months
of the child's life, before the mother placed the child [for adoption]." 9
Therefore, the court reasoned "where the child is no longer a newborn
and has already established strong ties with a father who has acknowl-
edged and supported him,"80 the five-day requirement no longer oper-
ated to attain the goal of rapid placement of newborns with adoptive
parents.8 1 Additionally, because the father had established a relation-
74. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 760, 408 N.W.2d 272, 274 (1987).
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984). For the exact language of the statute, see
supra note 46.
76. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272, 279 (1987).
Under different facts, the court had previously held § 43-104.02 to be constitu-
tional. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385
N.W.2d 448 (1986); see also notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
77. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272,279 (1987).
78. Id. at 767, 408 N.W.2d at 277.
79. Id. at 768, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
80. Id. at 768-69, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
81. Id. at 768, 408 N.W.2d at 278. The court reasoned that in some cases, the five-day
filing requirement operates as a "legitimate means of attaining a worthy end, the
rapid placement of newborns in families that could commit to raising them." Id.
"Rapid placement of newborns as soon as possible after birth with prospective
adoptive parents... [is] in the best interests of the child, the adoptive parents,
and the parent making the difficult decision to relinquish the child." Id. at 767,
408 N.W.2d at 278.
However, the 5-day requirement secures no such result in cases such as
this one, where the child is no longer a newborn and has already estab-
lished strong ties with a father who has acknowledged and supported
him. The effect of the requirement [in such cases] is to allow a mother to
singlehandedly sever a relationship between father and child, no matter
what the quality of that relationship is.
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ship with the child, the court held that no compelling interest would
be served by allowing an unwed mother "to singlehandedly sever a
relationship between a father and child."82 Therefore, the court held
section 43-104.02 unconstitutional as applied to the unwed father in
S.R.S & MB.S., and ruled the adoption of the unwed father's child
could not continue without the unwed father's consent.83
The Shoecraft and S.R.S. & M.B.S. decisions leave many unan-
swered questions regarding the rights of unwed fathers in Nebraska.
These unanswered questions provide little assurance to adoptive par-
ents regarding the validity and finality of present or future adoptions.
The S.RS. & MB.S. court, quoting the language of the dissent in
Caban v. Mohammed,84 stated that "'the [paternity] statutes now in
effect may be enforced as usual unless "the adoption of an older child
is sought" and "the father has established a substantial relationship
with the child and [is willing to admit] his paternity." ' "85 Such rea-
soning is unsatisfactory for prospectively determining an unwed fa-
ther's rights and useless for informing adoptive parents which
adoptions will be upheld if later challenged by an unwed father. It is
patently unfair to protect an unwed father's rights more vigorously
contingent upon the fact that the child is an "older child."
The unwed father in S.R.S. & MB.S. did have a substantial rela-
tionship with his child and the court correctly ruled his rights were
deserving of protection. Yet, the rights of the father in Shoecraft, who
never had an opportunity to develop or not develop a "substantial re-
lationship" with his infant child, were found to be undeserving of pro-
tection. The concurring opinion in S.R.S. & MB.S. convincingly
illustrates the problem with the Nebraska Supreme Court's inconsis-
tent method of determining which unwed fathers deserve to have
their rights protected:
To have the constitutionality of a law such as [section 43-104.02] depend in
each instance upon the facts determined after the fact is to fly in the very face
of the act's purpose. No adoptive parent can now know with certainty
whether the facts underlying the relationship between the natural father and
the adoptive child are such as to render the provisions of sections 43-104.02 to
Id. at 768-69, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
82. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
83. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 279. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Lancaster County Court to determine who would retain custody of the child,
based on the child's best interests. By stipulated settlement, the adoptive parents
and the biological father agreed that the child will live with the adoptive family
and the adoptive family will be the child's legal guardians. The biological father
will receive liberal visitation rights. The settlement agreement was approved by
the Lancaster County Court. Lincoln Journal Star, April 21, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
84. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
85. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272, 279 (1987)
(quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)) (citations omitted).
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section 43-104.04 constitutional or unconstitutional until after the facts have
been examined by a court. Furthermore, this court has now ruled, in effect,
that if the child is removed from the natural mother while in the hospital,
thereby making it impossible for the natural father to establish a relationship
with the child, the act will be held constitutional; but if the natural mother
delays placing the child out for adoption so that the natural father has the
opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, the act will be declared
unconstitutional.... Such uncertainty is bound to create much distress, as
evidenced by the instant case... and will continue to repeat itself in future
Cases86
If Nebraska adoption law continues to operate under the current
statutory scheme, our state will have to endure many more heart-
breaking cases like S.R.S. & MB.S. The current statutory scheme is
not sufficient to protect the rights of unwed fathers or to facilitate
valid, permanent adoptions. A new statute should establish clear ex-
pectations for unwed fathers and also should establish notification
procedures to best insure the finality of adoptions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM OF
NEBRASKA'S PATERNITY AND ADOPTION
STATUTES
A. Practical Problems with Nebraska's Paternity and Adoption Statutes
In Nebraska, if an unwed father fails to file an intent to claim pa-
ternity within five days of the birth of his nonmarital child, and if the
case does not involve an older child with whom the father has estab-
lished a relationship, the father is most likely precluded from ever
establishing parental rights to his child87 Even in cases in which the
nonmarital child is an older child with whom the father has estab-
lished a relationship, the father's parental rights are not clear-cut.
In Shoecraft, the court held the statutory five-day filing require-
ment constitutional as applied to the unwed father because the father
had not provided financial and emotional support to the mother dur-
ing her pregnancy.8 8 Under the standard set forth in S.R.S. & M.B.S.,
the five-day filing requirement is unconstitutional whenever a court
determines that an unwed father of an older child has "nurtured and
supported [the child] and the mother."8 9 The results of Shoecraft and
S.R.S. & MB.S. create several substantial problems for unwed fathers,
unwed mothers, adoptive parents, adoption agencies, and attorneys
handling adoptions-problems for which the current Nebraska stat-
utes provide no solution.
86. Id. at 770, 408 N.W.2d at 279 (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in result only)(emphasis
added).
87. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 279.
88. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 580, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986).
89. In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 768, 408 N.W.2d 272, 278 (1987).
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The first and most significant problem with the current Nebraska
paternity and adoption statutes is the uncertain status of an unwed
father's rights and responsibilities. This uncertainty leaves a large
number of constitutional bases for an unwed father to contest the va-
lidity of relinquishment and adoption of his nonmarital child after the
child has been placed with an adoptive family. This problem is clearly
illustrated in S.R.S. & M.B.S. where the adoptive home was shattered
by the court's post-adoption ruling that the lack of the unwed father's
consent rendered the adoption invalid. The result is that all adoptions
in which consent was not obtained from the biological father are of
questionable validity.
Another serious problem with Nebraska's current paternity and
adoption statutes is that, in many cases, an unwed mother can single-
handedly sever the unwed father's rights to his child. Under the cur-
rent statutes, only the unwed mother's consent to the adoption is
necessary absent the father's compliance with the five-day filing re-
quirement.90 The unwed mother can easily frustrate the ability of the
unwed father to establish parental rights to his child by refusing to
identify the father or by concealing the existence of the pregnancy
altogether.
Unless an unwed father is: 1) aware of the mother's pregnancy or
the child's existence; 2) aware of the mother's relinquishment; and 3)
aware of, and fulfills, the five-day filing requirement, Nebraska's pa-
ternity and adoption statutes do not provide even minimal procedures
for notifying him of proceedings involving his nonmarital child. In
both Shoecraft and S.R.S. & M.B.S., the unwed father was listed on the
birth certificate. 91 Both fathers easily could have been given notice of
the mother's relinquishment, the subsequent adoption proceedings,
and the father's legal rights and responsibilities. It is ironic that our
society expends so much effort aiding and counseling unwed mothers
regarding their rights and options, while an unwed father is not even
informed of relinquishment and adoption proceedings involving his
child.
B. Solving the Problems with Nebraska's Paternity and Adoption
Statutes Through Statutory Reform
1. Statutory Reform
The problems with Nebraska's paternity and adoption statutes can
be solved only through statutory reform, as the existing statutes are
wholly inadequate for providing an environment that facilitates valid
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1984).
91. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 575, 385 N.W.2d 448,
450 (1986); In re Application of S.R.S. & M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 760, 408 N.W.2d 272,
274 (1987).
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and permanent adoptions. The Nebraska paternity and adoption stat-
utes should be completely reformed to provide procedures for notify-
ing all unwed fathers of relinquishment and adoption proceedings
concerning their nonmarital children, and to notify fathers of pre-
cisely what is required to retain parental rights with regard to their
nonmarital children. The statutes must not merely be altered to avoid
future occurrences of the fact scenarios present in S.R.S. & M.B.S. and
Shoecraft. The statutes must be completely redesigned to avoid both
the contingencies we have seen before and the contingencies yet to
come.
The most important aspect of a newly-designed statutory proce-
dure is that all putative fathers must receive notification of the
mother's relinquishment. Only after notification should the courts at-
tempt to determine whether a particular unwed father is a fit parent.
Above all, the determination of parental fitness should be made by the
courts, not by the parties involved in facilitating the adoption.
The statutory scheme must not set forth categories of unwed fa-
thers who "deserve" notification. Invariably there would be fact situa-
tions not anticipated by the statute's drafters. Consequently, unwed
fathers would claim their rights were violated because they should
have been included in the categories of fathers receiving notice and
that would continue to threaten the finality of adoptions. To be effec-
tive, a new statutory system must notify all unwed fathers and then
determine if, through their behavior, they have forfeited their paren-
tal rights.
The current statutes should be reformed, despite the fact that chil-
dren may be placed for adoption more rapidly under the current statu-
tory procedures. Placing a child with adoptive parents as soon as
possible after birth is a worthy goal. Yet, expediting the placement of
a child without taking time to clarify the rights and interests of the
biological parents puts the adoption at greater risk of being invali-
dated after placement has occurred. Increased litigation over chil-
dren, invalidation of adoptions, and possibly even removal of children
from adoptive homes will not facilitate a greater number of adoptions,
nor will it protect the best interests of the child, as evidenced by S.RS.
& M.B.S.
In order to truly facilitate valid and permanent adoptions, an un-
wed father's rights must be fully recognized and respected through
procedures which inform him of his rights and responsibilities regard-
ing his nonmarital child. If the unwed father's rights are respected,
and he subsequently consents to the adoption of his nonmarital child,
then the prospective adoptive parents will know that their adoption of
the child is very likely a valid and final adoption.
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2. Discussion of Recommended Statutes
The key to protecting the parental rights of unwed fathers and in-
suring the finality of adoptions is determining whether a child was
born outside of marriage, the identity of the unwed father, and the
status of the unwed father's paternal rights prior to the mother's re-
linquishment of the child.92 It may not always be possible to make
these determinations prior to the mother's relinquishment, but at the
very least these determinations should be made prior to placement of
the child with the prospective adoptive family. In some cases, place-
ments may be delayed temporarily to comply with the necessary pro-
cedures, but once the unwed father's rights are determined, placement
can be made with the knowledge that once the six-month waiting pe-
riod is over and the adoption petition is granted, the adoption is per-
manent. Waiting to contend with the unwed father's rights until the
six-month waiting period is over and the adoption petition is filed
places both the prospective adoptive family and the unwed father in
an emotionally charged situation which may lead to more difficult
legal determinations of parental rights.
The burden of notifying the unwed father of the proposed or actual
relinquishment of the child, and of his rights and responsibilities re-
garding the child, should not be placed solely with those people acting
as agents for the unwed mother or the prospective adoptive parents.
However, by placing the initial burden of determining the interests of
the biological father and notifying the biological father of his rights on
the agency or attorney contacted by the mother,93 the burden on tax-
payers is minimal. Most of the burden of observing the rights of the
biological father would be borne by those effectuating the adoptions,
not by the state. The purpose of appointing a guardian ad litem94 is to
insure that an objective third party has the last opportunity to deter-
mine if the interests of the biological father have been protected.
Although the cost of a guardian ad litem would be absorbed by the
state, that cost would most likely be minimal in the majority of cases.
Additionally, appointing a guardian ad litem would be necessary only
in a very small percentage of cases.
The appointment of a guardian ad litem is necessary to truly re-
spect the rights of the biological father and the best interests of the
child. The attempt to identify and notify the prospective biological fa-
ther or fathers must be vigorous, yet it must observe, whenever possi-
ble, the privacy interests of the unwed mother.
Neither the guardian ad litem nor the court should be able to force
92. See infra § 1.1 Sample Statute p. 402.
93. See infra §§ 1.2-1.5 Sample Statute p. 402-03.
94. See infra §§ 2.1-2.4 Sample Statute p. 403-04.
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the biological mother to disclose the identity of the biological father.95
However, the relinquishment and adoption procedure should make it
as difficult as possible for the biological mother to deliberately and
singlehandedly sever the rights of the biological father. Requiring the
biological mother to testify under oath, in a private hearing, that she is
unable to identify the biological father will make it difficult for her to
lie and will make it difficult for her attorney or agency representative
to ethically recommend that she not disclose the identity of the fa-
ther.96 Furthermore, if agencies and attorneys are aware a judicial de-
termination of the identity of the father will occur at some time in the
process, the agencies and attorneys will be more likely to encourage
the mother to disclose the identity of the biological father within the
confidentiality of the agency's or attorney's relationship with the bio-
logical mother.
If the agency or attorney contacted by the biological mother is un-
able to identify or locate the biological father, the burden is then on
the guardian ad litem to notify the biological or prospective biological
fathers, if reasonably possible. The attempts to notify must be vigor-
ous to fully protect the best interests of the child.97 The best interests
of the child and the adoptive family clearly are not served when an
adoption is nullified some time after the adoption petition has been
granted. Therefore, the guardian ad litem should exercise great care
in attempting to notify the unwed father. Again, it is crucial that
there be no attempt by the notifying party to determine whether a
particular father "deserves" notice. The court should determine a par-
ticular father's parental fitness in a proceeding which adequately pro-
tects the father's rights and insures the accuracy of all information
regarding the mother and father's relationship.
If the biological mother discloses that the pregnancy was the result
of incest, the biological father does not need to be notified of any pro-
ceedings regarding his child.98 If the mother alleges the child was con-
ceived as a result of a sexual assault, the biological father must receive
notice of the proceedings involving his child.99 However, if the court
determines the child was in fact conceived as the result of a sexual
assault, the father's consent will not be required for a valid relinquish-
ment by the biological mother.10 0
When the guardian ad litem has identified and notified the biologi-
cal father or prospective biological fathers, or when the guardian ad
litem has exhausted a search for the father and has been unable to
95. See infra § 1.5 Sample Statute p. 403.
96. See infra § 2.3 Sample Statute p. 404.
97. See infra §§ 2.1-2.3 Sample Statute pp. 403-04.
98. See infra § 3.2 Sample Statute p. 404.
99. See infra § 1.2 Sample Statute p. 402.
100. See infra § 7.3 Sample Statute p. 406.
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identify or locate him, the guardian ad litem should report the status
of the paternity determination to the court.
The statutory time limit for the guardian ad litem's search should
be thirty days.101 However, the court should be able to extend this
time period upon a showing of reasonable cause. The court should not
allow the child to be placed in the prospective adoptive home unless
the prospective adoptive parents have been warned that the interests
of the biological father have not been determined yet, and the child
may be removed from the prospective adoptive home if the biological
father chooses to assert his parental right to custody and the court
finds him fit to do so.102
If the attorney or agency contacted by the biological mother or the
guardian ad litem has been able to identify the biological father, but
the father has not been located or notified, the court should be al-
lowed to order notification through publication to the unwed fa-
ther. 0 3 The court should not order publication in cases in which the
prospective biological father is unknown; such publication most likely
would be ineffective without the biological mother's name. The
mother's name should never be included in the publication without
her consent.104
If more than one man claims to be the biological father of the child,
the court should specify procedures for a genetic determination. At
the custodial determination hearing, the court should determine
whether allowing the biological father custody of the child would be in
the best interests of the child, affording superior rights to the natural
parents, yet liaying due regard to the rights of any parties seeking cus-
tody who have established a pyschological bond with the child. Courts
should consider establishing visitation rights for biological parents in
cases where "psychological parents" have established a significant and
lengthy relationship with the child.105 The guardian ad litem should
make his or her recommendation at the custodial hearing. The court's
determination should not be based on a comparison between the socio-
economic status of the biological father and a prospective adoptive
family.
If a court is forced to enter an order terminating the parental
rights of an unknown, unidentified, or unlocated father, the order
should not become final until the adoption petition is granted after the
101. See infra § 2.4 Sample Statute p. 404.
102. See infra § 1.1 Sample Statute p. 402.
103. See infra §§ 4.1-4.2 Sample Statute pp. 404-05.
104. See infra § 4.3 Sample Statute p. 405.
105. See infra § 7.2 Sample Statute p. 406. In S.RS. & MRS., the court accepted an
agreement between the biological father and adoptive parents whereby the adop-
tive parents retained custody of the child, but the father retained reasonable visi-
tation privileges. See Lincoln Journal Star, April 21, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
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six-month waiting period.106 The prospective adoptive parents should
be apprised, before the child is placed in the home, that the biological
father has not been identified and has not given consent to the relin-
quishment, and that the order terminating his rights will not be final
until the end of the six-month waiting period.10 7
3. Recommended Statutes
Section 1: Duties of the Notifying Party
§ 1.1 Whenever a child is claimed to be born out of wedlock, and
the biological mother contacts an adoption agency or attorney to relin-
quish her rights to the child, or the biological mother joins in a peti-
tion for adoption to be filed by her husband, the agency or attorney
contacted must establish that the child was in fact born outside of
marriage, must establish the identity of the biological father, and must
obtain a consent to relinquishment and adoption or a waiver of rights
from the biological father, before filing the intent to relinquish, actual
relinquishment, or adoption petition with the court. 0 8
§ 1.2 In order to attempt to obtain the consent to relinquishment
and adoption from the biological father, the agency or attorney con-
tacted by the biological mother (the notifying party) must notify by
certified mail:
a. Any person adjudicated by a court in this state or by a court
in another state or territory of the United States to be the father of
the child;
b. Any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate
as the child's father;
c. Any person who might be the father of the child who is
openly living with the child and the child's mother at the time the
relinquishment is given, or any person who is holding himself out
to be the child's father;
d. Any person who has been identified as the child's father by
the mother;
e. Any person who was married to the child's mother within
six months prior to the birth of the child and prior to the execution
of the relinquishment, and;
f. Any other male who the notifying party may have reason to
believe may be the father of the child.109
§ 1.3 The notice sent to the notifying party shall inform any of the
above individuals that:
106. See infra § 5 Sample Statute p. 404.
107. Id.
108. See MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 710.36(1) (West Supp. 1987).
109. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-2 (2) (a-h) (Mckinney 1977, Supp. 1988).
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a) relinquishment has been given by the mother or that the
mother intends to execute a relinquishment;
b) that the possible biological father is advised of his right to file
with the Department of Social Services on a form provided by the
department, his notice of intent to claim paternity of the child to be
relinquished, and his intent to assert his right of custody to the
child;
c) that the possible biological father's failure to file his notice of
intent to claim paternity and custody of the child with the Depart-
ment of Social Services within twenty days of the receipt of the
notice shall constitute a waiver of his right to consent to the adop-
tion of the child;
d) that the father has the opportunity to relinquish the child;
and
e) that the father has a duty to contribute to the support and
education of the child and to the pregnancy-related expenses of the
mother should he prove to be the father of the child, and a right to
claim visitation should custody not be awarded.
§ 1.4 If the mother refuses to identify the biological father or possi-
ble biological fathers, the notifying party shall inform the mother of
the legal and medical need to determine the paternity of the child
prior to adoption.
§ 1.5 If the notifying party is unable to locate and notify the biolog-
ical father or possible biological fathers, or if the mother refuses or is
unable to identify the father, the notifying party shall execute an affi-
davit stating that such party has used due diligence to locate the bio-
logical father or possible biological fathers, and setting forth the
methods through which the effort was made to locate those persons.
The affidavit shall be attached to any intent to relinquish or actual
relinquishment executed by the biological mother, and to any adop-
tion petition filed by the biological mother and her spouse.
Section 2: Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem
§ 2.1 If an intent to relinquish or actual relinquishment by the
mother, or any petition for adoption by the biological mother and her
spouse is filed, and does not contain the written consent of the biologi-
cal father when received by the court, or contains an affidavit stating
that the biological father is unknown or can not be located, the court
will appoint a guardian ad litem to determine the interests of the bio-
logical father and to represent the best interests of the child. The
guardian ad litem will be chosen from a qualified pool of local attor-
neys. The guardian ad litem will receive reasonable compensation for
the representation, the amount of which shall be determined at the
discretion of the court.
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§ 2.2 The guardian ad litem shall have the following duties:
a. Identify the biological father whenever possible;
b. Notify the biological father or prospective biological fathers
of the proposed relinquishment of the child and inform the biologi-
cal father or prospective biological fathers of their parental rights
with regard to the child;
c. Notify the court if all reasonable attempts to both identify
and notify the biological father are unsuccessful.
§ 2.3 To determine the interests of the biological father, the guard-
ian ad litem shall determine, by deposition, affidavit, or hearing, the
following:
a) whether the mother was married at the time of conception of
the child or at any time thereafter;
b) whether the mother was cohabitating with a man at the time
of conception or birth of the child;
c) whether the mother has received support payments or
promises of support with respect to the child or in connection with
her pregnancy; or
d) whether any man has formally or informally acknowledged
or declared his possible paternity of the child.110
§ 2.4 The guardian ad litem shall complete the determination of
the interests of the biological father within thirty days of appoint-
ment, unless the court finds reasonable cause to extend the time pe-
riod. After the guardian ad litem has completed the determination,
the court shall hold a hearing as soon as practicable to determine
whether the child was born out of wedlock, to determine the identity
of the father, if possible, and to determine or terminate the rights of
the biological father.
Section 3: Notice Requirements
§ 3.1 Notice of the judicial proceeding shall be given to every per-
son identified by the guardian ad litem as the biological father or as a
prospective biological father. Notice shall be given in the manner ap-
propriate under the rules of civil procedure for the service of process
in this state and in any additional manner the court directs. Proof of
notice shall be filed with the court before the petition is heard."'1
§ 3.2 Notice is not required to be given to a person who may be the
father of a child conceived as a result of an incestual act.112
110. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1129 (b) (1986).
111. See id. § 38-1129 (e) (1986).
112. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (2)(m) (West 1982).
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Section 4: Notice by Publication
§ 4.1 If the guardian ad litem is unable to locate and notify an iden-
tified biological father, the court has discretion to order that the
guardian ad litem attempt to notify the identified biological father
through publication.
§ 4.2 If publication is deemed appropriate, the court will determine
which newspaper is likely to give notice. The court shall consider the
last known residence of the prospective father, the location of his rela-
tives, if known, or the last known location of the prospective father.
The publication shall include the date, place and location of the hear-
ing, the court file number, the name, address and telephone number of
the guardian ad litem and other information the court determines to
be necessary to give effective notice to the prospective father. Such
information shall include the following, if known:
a. the name of the father or prospective father;
b. a description of the father;
c. the former address of the father;
d. approximate date and place of conception of the child;
e. date and place of birth of the child.113
§ 4.3 The publication should not include the name of the mother
unless the mother gives her consent. The notice shall not include the
name of the child unless the court determines that inclusion of the
child's name is essential to give effective notice to the father.114
Section 5: Terminating the Rights of an Unknown Father
§ 5 If, after the inquiry by the guardian ad litem, no father can be
identified or successfully notified, and no person has appeared claim-
ing to be the biological father and claiming custodial rights, the court
shall enter an order terminating the unknown biological father's
rights with reference to the child. Subject to the disposition of an ap-
peal, upon the expiration of six months after an order terminating pa-
rental rights is issued under this subsection, the order shall not be
questioned by any person, in any manner, or upon any ground, includ-
ing fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or
lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter.115
Section 6: Termination Through Failure to Appear
§ 6 If a prospective father is identified to the satisfaction of the
guardian ad litem, or if more than one man is identified as a possible
father, each shall be given notice of the paternity proceeding. If any
113. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (4)(b)(4) (West 1987).
114. See id. § 48.42 (4)(b)(5) (West 1987).
115. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 25(d), 9B U.L.A. 340 (1973).
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one of them fails to appear without reasonable cause, or, if appearing,
fails to claim custodial rights, his parental rights with reference to the
child shall be terminated.116
Section 7: The Determination of Parental Rights
§ 7.1 If a man who alleges that he is the biological father appears at
the hearing and wishes to contest the termination of his parental
rights, the court shall set a date for a hearing on the issue of paternity
or, if all parties agree, the court may immediately commence hearing
testimony concerning the issue of paternity. The court shall inform
the man claiming to be the father of the child of his right to counsel.117
§ 7.2 At the hearing to determine the biological father's parental
rights to the child, the court shall inquire into his fitness and ability to
properly care for the child. The custody of the child is to be deter-
mined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the supe-
rior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable biological parent and with due
regard for any substantial relationship the child may have developed
with other persons claiming custody."18
§ 7.3 The court may determine the father's consent is not required
for a valid relinquishment by the biological mother, or a valid adoption
by the biological mother and her spouse, upon a finding of any of the
following:
a. The father abandoned or neglected the child after having
knowledge of the child's birth;
b. The father is unfit as a parent;
c. The father had knowledge of the child's birth and has made
no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child;
d. The father abandoned the mother, without reasonable
cause, and with knowledge of the pregnancy;
e. The child was conceived as the result of a sexual assault or
an incestual act.' 19
§ 7.4 All proceedings under this article shall be given the highest
priority and shall be advanced on the court docket so as to provide for
their earliest practical disposition. An adjournment or continuance of
a proceeding under this article shall not be granted without a showing
of good cause.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for society to recognize and respect the rights of
116. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1129 (c) (1986).
117. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.423 (West 1987).
118. See MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 710.39 (1) (West Supp. 1987).
119. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1129 (c) (1-6) (1986).
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unwed fathers as carefully as it protects the rights of unwed mothers.
The law must adapt to a changing society. Men have assumed a much
greater portion of the child rearing responsibilities than they have in
the past and, accordingly, must be afforded the same consideration as
women in custody and reproductive issues.
The current precarious state of adoptions in Nebraska must not
continue. Legislators must seize the opportunity to remedy the unsat-
isfactory status of Nebraska's paternity and adoption statutes. The
adoption community cannot withstand another blow as devastating as
the one received in S.RS. & M.B.S.
Susan Kubert Sapp '89
